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The Implementation of Inter-American Norms on 
Freedom of Religion in the National Legislation of 
OAS Member States 
Evaldo Xavier Gomes 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 22, 1969, members of the Organization of 
American States (“OAS”) met in San José, Costa Rica, to adopt the 
American Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”).1 After its 
eleventh ratification, deposited by Grenada on July 18, 1978, the 
treaty went into force.2 Through this Pact of San José, the OAS 
established two organs “to supervise the implementation and 
enforcement of the rights contained therein.”3 These organs, namely, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Court”), have 
protected the right to exercise religious freedom in the American 
hemisphere by vigorously promoting the defense of all human rights. 
While the Commission existed prior to adoption of the Convention, 
the Convention redefined its functions4 and created the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.5 It also outlined specific human 
rights and norms, including rights to religious freedom.6  
 
  PhD in Utroque Iure (Canon and Civil Law). The author would like to thank Rex P. 
Nielson for his help in translation and the staff of the BYU Law Review for their editorial 
assistance. 
 1. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 2. See id. at art. 74(2). The table of signatory states and dates of ratification is included 
at 1144 U.N.T.S., at 144 n. 1. Id. 
 3. SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (1992). 
 4.  See Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 34–51. 
 5. See id. at arts. 52–73; see also Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The 
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a 
Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593, 600, 610 (2000).  
 6. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 12(1)–(4) (“1. Everyone has the right to freedom 
of conscience and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s 
religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either 
individually or together with others, in public or in private. 2. No one shall be subject to 
restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs. 3. 
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On various occasions, the Court and the Commission have 
intervened to revise domestic legislation of OAS member states to 
guarantee religious freedom. These interventions are particularly 
significant because of the relationship between Inter-American 
regional norms and the internal legal ordinances of states parties to 
the Convention. Article 2 of the Convention obligates the states 
parties to ensure the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein,7 and 
therefore the regional norms espoused by the Convention prevail 
over conflicting national laws.8 Practical examples of both the 
regional organs protecting human rights and the pronouncements of 
the General Assembly of the OAS corroborate the efficacy of the 
system in protecting religious freedom for each individual. 
In this Article, I discuss the legal instruments enacted to expand 
and enforce human rights among the member states of the OAS. I 
also summarize examples of specific cases brought before the 
Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. While 
both organs are valuable institutions for the development of human 
rights law in the Inter-American system, they cannot replace 
protection of religious freedom at the national level. The Inter-
American system’s organs of human rights protection serve the 
important purpose of voicing regional condemnation of human 
rights violations and of enforcing the commitment of each state to 
protect its citizens’ rights and freedoms. In Part II, I outline the 
method used by the Commission and the Court to effectuate the 
rights protected by the instruments of human rights protection in 
the Inter-American system. In Part III, I discuss cases that have 
come before the Commission and the Court dealing specifically with 
the protection of religious freedom. 
 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations 
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the 
rights or freedoms of others. 4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to 
provide for the religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with 
their own convictions.”). 
 7. Id. at art. 2. 
 8.  Indeed, the Preamble to the Convention affirms that the parties recognize: 
[T]hat the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a national of a 
certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they 
therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or 
complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States. 
Id. at Pmbl. 
DO NOT DELETE 9/18/2009 4:45 PM 
575 The Implementation of Inter-American Norms 
 577 
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION AND INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. States’ Duties to Guarantee Rights 
In the first article of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the states parties to the Convention agree to undertake to 
respect, guarantee, and permit the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognized in the Convention.9 Among the rights specified 
in the Convention is the right of each individual person10 who is 
subject to the jurisdiction of a member state to exercise his rights 
and freedoms without any discrimination of a religious nature.11 
Thus, the Convention incorporates into its first article the principle 
of nondiscrimination. 
According to the norms of Article 2 of the Convention, states 
parties have the duty to guarantee the right to exercise freedoms 
protected by the Convention.12 To accomplish this, they must, in 
accordance with their own constitutional processes, adopt legislative 
or other measures necessary to implement these rights and 
freedoms.13 While such measures are to be adopted in accordance 
with the respective constitutional norms of the member state, the 
obligation to comply with the terms of the Convention are 
unqualified. The most obvious method for member states to give 
effect to the norms of the Convention is by including these norms in 
their national legislation, but the Convention does not forbid doing 
so through measures of another nature. The intent of Article 2 is 
thus to guarantee the efficacy of the norms of the Convention by 
imposing a positive duty on the states parties to change any 
noncompliant laws. Otherwise, the Convention would run the risk of 
becoming a dead letter, having no application in the lives of the 
individuals within the jurisdiction of its member states. 
The Commission plays an important role in monitoring the 
states’ observance of Article 2 of the Convention. To this end, the 
 
 9. Id. at art. 1. 
 10. The Convention clarifies the definition of “person” as meaning “every human 
being.” Id. at art. 1(2). 
 11. Id. at art. 1(1). 
 12. Id. at art. 2. 
 13. Id. 
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Commission releases an annual report identifying human rights 
problems within states parties to the Convention. This system of 
monitoring encourages countries found to have human rights 
problems to voluntarily remedy violations through changes in their 
domestic laws before being brought before the Commission or the 
Court. A concrete example of a change in law that resulted from the 
influence of the Commission on an OAS member state is Colombian 
law No. 288/96, passed by the Congress of Colombia on July 5, 
1996.14 This law regulates the procedure to comply with the 
decisions of international organs to protect human rights, such as the 
Commission,15 which had condemned Colombia for violating human 
rights.16 The Colombian law created a competent Committee of 
Ministers to consider the decisions of the international organization, 
and in cases where the Committee agrees with the international 
body’s decision, the law requires the government to pay 
compensation to human rights victims.17 The adoption of law No. 
288 by Columbia was subsequently recognized by the Inter-
American Commission as a “very important measure taken to protect 
human rights in Columbia.”18 However, the Commission noted that 
Colombia needed to take further steps to effectively ensure 
compliance with all of the Commission’s recommendations, 
including the recommendations that states investigate and sanction 
those who violate human rights.19 
 
 14. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev., Ch. V, ¶ 7 (1996), available at http://www.cidh. 
oas.org/annualrep/96eng/chap.5.htm#COLOMBIA [hereinafter 1996 Annual Report]. The 
report was approved by the Commission in its 95th Ordinary Period of Sessions, held between 
February 24, 1997, and March 14, 1997. 
 15. Id. at Ch. V, ¶¶ 7–8. 
 16. In its 1995 report, the Commission condemned Colombia for failure to comply 
with Article 2 of the Convention when the Colombian army executed a Swiss missionary. 
Hildegard María Feldman v. Colombia, Case 11.010, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 15/95, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 rev. (1995), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/ 
95eng/Colombia11010.htm. 
 17. See 1996 Annual Report, supra note 14, at Ch. V, ¶ 8. 
 18. Id. at Ch. V, ¶ 10. 
 19. Id. 
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B. Meaning and Reach of Commission Recommendations According to 
the Interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
As part of its responsibilities, the Commission makes 
recommendations to member nations. In order to fully understand 
the meaning of the term “recommendations” as it is used by the 
Commission, it is helpful to look to the judgments of the Inter-
American Court. According to the judgment of the Court in the case 
of Caballero-Delgado & Santana, the term should be interpreted 
according to the regulations of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.20 In the understanding of the 
Court, this means that “a recommendation does not have the 
character of an obligatory judicial decision for which the failure to 
comply would generate State responsibility.”21 Thus, states cannot be 
held responsible for refusing to follow a Commission 
recommendation—the recommendation is not obligatory. Apart 
from suffering the potential embarrassment or reciprocity that may 
attend flouting the decisions of an international organization, states 
are free to ignore Commission recommendations without fear of 
reprisal. 
Nearly two years later in the case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru,22 the 
Inter-American Court reaffirmed this same understanding, but in a 
more nuanced way. From a wider perspective which takes into 
account the principle of good faith “embodied in . . . Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention,” the Court judged that a member state 
participating in a treaty on human rights “has the obligation to make 
every effort to apply [sic] with the recommendations of a protection 
organ such as the Inter-American Commission.”23 Specifically 
regarding a state’s responsibility to comply or not with the 
recommendations, the Court asserted that, by ratifying the 
Convention, states parties “engage themselves to apply the 
 
 20. Caballero-Delgado & Santana v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22, ¶ 
67 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_22_ing.pdf. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states, “A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 21. Caballero-Delgado & Santana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22, ¶ 67. 
 22. Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (Sept. 17, 1997), 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ seriec_33_ing.pdf. 
 23. Id. ¶ 80. 
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recommendations made by the Commission in its reports.”24 The 
Court does not use the term obligation, but rather affirms the duty 
of the states parties to follow the recommendations of the 
Commission as part of the commitment assumed as members of the 
Inter-American system and as part of their adherence to the 
Commission’s legal instruments. 
C. State Implementation of Inter-American Norms Protecting 
Religious Freedom 
When a country violates a right guaranteed by the Convention, a 
person or group of persons, or any legally recognized non-
governmental entity may petition the Commission to review the 
state’s conduct.25 Upon acceptance of a petition the Commission 
collects the facts, seeks to assist the parties in reaching a friendly 
settlement, and may issue recommendations to the involved parties.26 
Depending upon the violation and the Commission’s judgment of 
the best interests of the state, the Commission might refer the 
violation to be reviewed by the Inter-American Court.27 According 
to the Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court is an “autonomous judicial institution whose 
purpose is the application and interpretation of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court exercises its functions in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Statute.”28 
When considered necessary, the Court imposes upon the responsible 
state (or states) the obligation to make reparations for the harm 
caused and to pay an adequate indemnity.29 Furthermore, Article 
63(1) of the Convention states that in the event of a violation, “the 
 
 24. Id. ¶ 81. 
 25. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 44. For more detail on the Commission’s 
procedure for resolving cases, see the Commission’s website article, What is the IACHR?, 
http://www.iachr.org/what.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
 26. Rules for admissibility of petitions and procedures for resolution of the matter are 
outlined in the Convention at Articles 46 through 51. Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 46–
51. 
 27. Id. at art. 61; see also What is the IACHR?, supra note 25 (“The decision as to 
whether a case should be submitted to the Court or published should be made on the basis of 
the best interests of human rights in the Commission’s judgment.”). 
 28. Organization of American States [OAS], Statute of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, art. 1, AG/RES. 448 (IX-O/79), (Oct. 1979), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/basic19.statute %20of%20the%20ia%20court.htm. 
 29. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
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Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of 
his right of freedom that was violated.”30 Thus, the Court not only 
has power to order states to pay indemnities, it also has power to 
enjoin the States prospectively to guarantee their citizens’ human 
rights. 
Unlike those of the Commission, the decisions of the Court have 
a definitive character and may not be appealed.31 Therefore, the 
condemned State must respect and comply with them. However, in 
order for the Court to issue binding decisions on particular cases, the 
state in question must have already consented to the Court’s 
“contentious jurisdiction.”32 For those states that do subject 
themselves to the Court’s jurisdiction, the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention trump any contrary state law, and the Court constitutes 
the highest authority on the interpretation and protection of those 
rights. In cases of extreme gravity, demonstrated need, or in order to 
avoid irreparable harm, Article 26 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure 
provides that the Court may ex-officio, or at the request of the 
parties, judge that a member State adopt provisional measures.33 
Certainly member states are not always anxious to comply with 
Court decisions. The Court generally issues two types of remedies 
for a member’s violation: (1) a trial and decision pursuant to 
alterations in the state’s domestic law, and (2) monetary 
compensation.34 However, while states do often pay financial 
compensation, they “routinely ignore the requirement that they 
punish offenders or change their laws.”35 While the Court does not 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at arts. 67–68 (“The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to 
appeal.”). 
 32. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 62; see Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice 
of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 (1985); Andrew T. 
Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 
1721 (2008) (noting that each member country of the Organization “must make a separate 
declaration to the Secretary General of the OAS giving unconditional consent to jurisdiction, 
or consent on condition of reciprocity, for a specific period of specific cases”). As of 2008, 
twenty-four countries have submitted to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Id. Significantly, 
the United States and Canada are not among them. Id. The American states’ various 
declarations, reservations, and denunciations of the Court and Convention are available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-32.html. 
 33. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 
26(1) (2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/motivos_ing.pdf. 
 34. Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 32, at 1721. 
 35. Eric A. Posner & John C. YOO, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 
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release positive statistics for full compliance with its decisions, figures 
can be derived from other statistics kept by the Court. In 2007 the 
Court reported that it had decided ninety-five cases over the course 
of its existence.36 It further reported that eighty-four cases remained 
in a stage of monitoring of compliance.37 Since the Court only closes 
a case after it has declared full compliance, one would assume that 
only eleven cases had obtained a level of compliance sufficient to 
warrant the cessation of monitoring. If this estimate is accurate, the 
rate of full compliance with Court decisions would be about 11.6%.38 
Increased member compliance with Commission opinions and Court 
decisions is one of the main goals for the organization’s future. 
D. The Relation between Regional Inter-American Norms Protecting 
Religious Freedom and Member States’ Domestic Laws 
On several occasions, the Court and the Inter-American 
Commission have made pronouncements stipulating that states 
parties to the Convention cannot invoke internal laws to circumvent 
Inter-American System compliance. The most telling illustrations of 
this principle are revealed in the Commission’s and the Court’s 
amnesty cases. For instance, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Chile, 
Suriname, and El Salvador39 passed amnesty laws that the 
Commission considered to be incompatible with the content and 
spirit of the Convention.40 Moreover, when Peru implemented a 
decree providing amnesty to individuals suspected of substantial 
human rights violations,41 the Court found that the Peruvian 
 
93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005). 
 36.  Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 59 (2007). 
 37.  Id. at 64. 
 38. Posner and Yoo, writing in 2005, estimate an even lower rate of compliance of 5%. 
Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 43. They observe that, according to their estimate, the Court 
enjoys a mere 1% advantage over compliance with the Commission’s non-binding 
recommendations. Id. 
 39.  See generally PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 336 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 40. See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Reporting in the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights Protection, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 
333, 336 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). 
 41. These violations included torture; summary, extra-legal, and arbitrary executions; 
and forced disappearances. See Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Merits of 
Coordination of International Courts on Human Rights, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 309, 311 
(2004). 
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government had passed these laws intending to impede the 
investigation of human-rights violations and were therefore 
prohibited by the Convention.42 Similar rulings have been applied to 
amnesty laws adopted by Chile, Suriname, and El Salvador. 
In the case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, the Court judged 
that the Chilean amnesty law, Decree No. 2.191, was inconsistent 
with the content and spirit of the Convention and therefore had no 
legal effect.43 The origins of the case stemmed from a coup d’état 
which overthrew the Chilean government on September 11, 1973.44 
In connection with the coup, the new military government 
performed a “cleanup operation” wherein it summarily executed 
several officials of the former government as well as individuals 
thought to be dangerous because of their leftist ideas.45 On 
September 16, 1973, Mr. Almonacid-Arellano, an activist in the 
Chilean Communist Party, was arrested at his home and then shot 
by the police while entering the police truck.46 He was taken by the 
police to the hospital where he died the following day.47 Chilean 
courts initiated a criminal investigation, but after nearly a year of 
dismissals and appeals, the Appeals Court of Rancagua confirmed the 
investigation’s dismissal.48 In 1978, the government declared that 
the Chilean state had overcome the “civil commotion” that had 
required military rule and, citing a need for national unity, passed a 
decree providing amnesty “to all individuals who performed illegal 
acts, whether as perpetrators, accomplices or accessories after the 
fact, during the siege in force from September 11, 1973 . . . .”49 The 
military regime ended in 1990, and after domestic criminal charges 
for Almonacid-Arellano’s murder failed, Mr. Almonacid-Arellano’s 
next of kin filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission 
 
 42. See id. (discussing the Court’s judgment in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf). 
 43. Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 119 
(Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_154_ing.pdf. 
 44. Id. ¶ 82(3). 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 82(3)–(7). 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 82(8)–(9). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. ¶ 82(10). 
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challenging the amnesty decree.50 Finally, in 2005 the Court received 
the case and in 2006 found Chile’s amnesty law to violate 
Convention norms.51 
Similarly, in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, the Court found 
Peru’s amnesty laws52 incompatible with the American Convention 
on Human Rights and, therefore, “lack[ing] legal effect.”53 The 
Commission adopted the same posture, and the Court confirmed it 
in relation to the 1989 amnesty law of Suriname, formerly Dutch 
Guiana, in the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname.54 
The Commission case of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y 
Galdámez v. El Salvador55 is considered of great political, social, and 
religious significance on an international level. The Inter-American 
Commission determined that the Republic of El Salvador’s approval 
 
 50. See id. ¶¶ 6, 82(11)–(37). 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 121–22 (“Since it ratified the American Convention on August 21, 1990, the 
State has kept Decree Law No. 2.191 in force for sixteen years, overtly violating the 
obligations set forth in said Convention. . . . [T]he Court determines that by formally keeping 
within its legislative corpus a Decree Law which is contrary to the wording and the spirit of the 
Convention, the State has not complied with the obligations imposed by Article 2 thereof.”). 
 52. The Peruvian decree, adopted by the Congress of Peru on June 14, 1995, and 
signed by the President the next day granted a general amnesty to all those members of the 
security forces and civilians who were the subject of a complaint, investigation, indictment, trial 
or conviction, or who were serving prison sentences for human rights violations committed 
between May 1980 and June 15, 1995. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
75, ¶ 2(i)–(j) (Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf. The effect of the decree was to quash the judicial investigations 
that had been initiated by Judge Antonia Saquicuray of the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima. 
Id. ¶¶ 2(h)–(i). Judge Saquicuray, however, held the law contrary to the Constitution and 
therefore inapplicable to the pending criminal case. Id. ¶ 2(k). This decision was appealed, but 
before a public hearing could be held, the Peruvian Congress approved a second amnesty law, 
Law No. 26492, which “declared that the amnesty could not be ‘revised’ by a judicial instance 
and that its application was obligatory,” id. ¶ 2(l)–(m), thus preventing judgments from being 
pronounced regarding the legality or applicability of the first amnesty law. Id.; see also Gómez 
Palomino v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, ¶ 54.7 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_136_ing.pdf. 
 53. Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 44. 
 54. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 167 
(June 15, 2005), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_124_ing.pdf (“As the Tribunal has asserted on repeated occasions, no domestic law or 
regulation—including amnesty laws and statutes of limitation—may impede the State’s 
compliance with the Court’s orders to investigate and punish perpetrators of human rights 
violations. If this were not the case, the rights found in the American Convention would be 
deprived of effective protection.” (footnote omitted)). 
 55. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 37/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/elsalvador11.481.htm. 
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of the “General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace” 
(Decree No. 486 of 1993) was a violation of the Convention.56 
More explicitly, the Commission declared that the State in question: 
[V]iolated Article 2 of the American Convention. In addition, by 
applying it to this case, the State has violated the right to justice 
and its duty to investigate, try, and make reparations, established in 
Articles 1(1), 8(1), and 25 of the American Convention, to the 
detriment of Monsignor Romero’s next-of-kin, the members of the 
religious community to which he belonged and Salvadoran society 
as a whole.57 
In similar fashion, the Commission declared that by approving this 
law, the Salvadorian government violated the “right to know the 
truth,”58 thereby injuring the relatives of Monsignor Romero, his 
religious community, and all Salvadorian society. 
Thus, a characteristic of the Inter-American System is the 
preemption of conventional regional norms over state internal laws 
that might offend protected human rights or restrict judicial 
procedure. When a country’s domestic laws encroach on 
fundamental human rights, it is the responsibility of the Commission 
and the Court within the Inter-American System to preserve 
enjoyment of these rights by declaring those laws invalid. 
III. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 
A. Protecting the Right to Conscientious Objection and Religious 
Freedom Through an “Amicable Solution”— Case of Alfredo Díaz 
Bustos v. Bolivia 
While cases condemning states for denial of religious freedom do 
not dominate the dockets of the Commission and the Court, the 
American Convention on Human Rights guarantees religious 
freedom so such cases would therefore fall within the jurisdiction of 
both the Commission and the Court. In the case of Alfredo Díaz 
Bustos v. Bolivia, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bolivia, on 
behalf of Mr. Bustos, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, 
 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 1–4. 
 57. Id. ¶ 158, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/ 
ElSalvador11.481a.htm. 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 146–48. 
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sought assistance from the Inter-American Commission.59 The 
petition claimed that Bolivia had violated Articles 1(1) (duty of the 
state to recognize rights and freedoms recognized in the 
Convention), 2 (duty of the state to adopt internal legal provisions 
to protect human rights), 12 (right to freedom of conscience and 
religion), 24 (right to equal protection), and 25 (right to judicial 
protection) of the Convention.60 The Commission further identified 
potential violations of Articles 13.1 (freedom of thought and 
expression), 22 (freedom of movement and residence), and 23 (right 
to participate in government) and declared the case admissible.61 
According to Mr. Bustos, Bolivia violated his freedom of 
conscience and religion and failed to comply with its obligations to 
protect rights guaranteed by the convention by refusing his claim to 
exemption from military service.62 The state further violated his right 
to equal protection by discriminating against him as a member of the 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses since Bolivian law permitted 
the exemption of Catholics from military service but not members of 
other faiths and religious confessions.63 Mr. Bustos further argued 
that, since the Bolivian Constitutional Court had held that “the right 
to conscientious objection to compulsory military service was not 
within the purview of the courts,” Bolivia had also deprived him of 
the right to judicial protection.64 
The case of Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia is a good example of 
the application of Article 48(1)(f) of the Convention, which requires 
the Commission to “place itself at the disposal of the parties . . . with 
a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of 
respect for the human rights recognized in [the] Convention.”65 On 
July 4, 2005, Bolivia and Bustos reached a friendly settlement in 
which Bolivia agreed to give Bustos his document of completed 
military service and to stipulate that as a conscientious objector, the 
government would not send him to the battlefront nor call him as an 
 
 59. Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia, Admissibility Petition 14/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 52/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5. rev. 1, ¶¶ 1–2 (2004), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2004eng/Bolivia.14.04eng.htm. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. ¶ 4. 
 62. Id. ¶ 2. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 48(1)(f). 
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aide in an armed conflict.66 For his part, Bustos agreed to (1) present 
a sworn statement (this was required for internal administrative 
purposes of the Ministry of Defense); (2) request that the 
Commission assign the status of friendly settlement to the case; and 
(3) renounce all costs and damages and agree not to initiate a new 
action based on the same facts.67 
An aspect of great relevance in this case was its influence in 
modifying the application of internal norms of the member states of 
the Inter-American System. As part of the agreement between 
parties, Bolivia, represented by the Ministry of Defense, agreed to: 
[I]nclude the right to conscientious objection to military service in 
the preliminary draft of the amended regulations for military law 
currently under consideration by the Ministry of Defense and the 
armed forces; [and] together with the Deputy Ministry of Justice, 
to encourage congressional approval of military legislation that 
would include the right to conscientious objection to military 
service.68 
The resolution of this case by friendly settlement precluded the 
Commission from issuing any recommendations regarding whether 
Article 12 of the Convention guarantees an absolute right to object 
to compulsory military service.69 The case does, however, show the 
profound effect that the Commission can have on developing the 
internal laws of states in the Inter-American System. Bolivia began at 
a point where the question of whether individuals had a right to 
conscientious objection could not even be considered by the highest 
court, but ended with an agreement to encourage congressional 
approval of such a right. Unfortunately, the Commission appears not 
to have pursued Bolivia’s adoption of these measures, and thus, the 
right to conscientious objection on religious grounds in Bolivia 
remains unclear. 
 
 66. Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia, Friendly Settlement, Petition 14/04, Inter- Am. 
C.H.R., Report No. 97/05, OES/Ser.L./V/II.124 Doc. 5, ¶ 16 (2005), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/ 2005eng/Bolivia14.04eng.htm. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See HITOMI TAKEMURA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE AND INDIVIDUAL DUTIES TO DISOBEY MANIFESTLY 
ILLEGAL ORDERS 116–17 (2008). The Commission did express the opinion that the friendly 
settlement was “fully consonant with the evolving nature of international human rights law, 
which protects the status of conscientious objector in those countries in which that status has 
been established by law.” Alfredo Diaz Bustos Friendly Settlement, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). 
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B. Implementing Inter-American Norms Through Adjudication—the 
Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” v. Chile 
The Inter-American Court case of “The Last Temptation of 
Christ”70 is perhaps the most renowned and contentious case relating 
to the right to freedom of religion in all of the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights Protection.71 In this case, Chilean citizens 
accused the Chilean government of violating Articles 12 (freedom of 
religion) and 13 (freedom of thought and expression) of the 
Convention based on the “judicial censorship of the cinematographic 
exhibition of the film ‘The Last Temptation of Christ,’ confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Chile . . . on June 17, 1997.”72 
The dispute surrounded Martin Scorsese’s controversial film, The 
Last Temptation of Christ, based on the book by Nikos Kazantzakis. 
In the film, the story of Jesus is portrayed but departs significantly 
from the rendition of the Gospels, including several elements 
considered outrageous by Christians.73 The Chilean 
Cinematographic Classification Council, a body authorized to 
supervise exhibition of films in Chile, originally refused to allow the 
exhibition of the film.74 However, in 1996, United International 
Pictures Ltd. succeeded in obtaining the Council’s authorization to 
exhibit the film for mature audiences.75 The Chilean Supreme 
Court’s censorship soon followed after a group of Chileans, acting 
“for and in the name of Jesus Christ, the Catholic Church, and 
themselves” obtained a judgment from the Court of Appeal of 
Santiago annulling the Council’s decision to authorize the film’s 
exhibition on January 20, 1997.76 The Supreme Court confirmed the 
Court of Appeal’s decision on June 17, 1997.77 According to the 
 
 70. “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile), Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/seriec_73_ing.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., Benedetto Conforti, La Tutela Internazionale della Libertà Religiosa, XV. 2 
Rivista Internazionale dei Diritti dell’Uomo 269–83 (2002). 
 72. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 73. For instance, the film portrays Christ as an ordinary man struggling with guilt and 
sexual temptations and also shows him forsaking his mission for a life of mortal comfort. See 
The Last Temptation of Christ (film), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Last_ 
Temptation_of_Christ_(film) (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
 74. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 60. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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Chilean Supreme Court, the defamed and dishonored presentation 
of the figure of Jesus Christ offended all those who, as was the case 
of the petitioners, founded their faith in Him.78 
The Court received the case after the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, during its 100th regular session, 
adopted report No. 69/98.79 In that report, the Commission 
concluded that: (1) the prohibition of the film The Last Temptation 
of Christ by the Chilean courts was incompatible with the norms of 
the Convention; (2) the Chilean State had violated the rights 
protected by Articles 12 (freedom of conscience and religion) and 13 
(freedom of thought and expression) of the Convention; and (3) by 
upholding this censorship, the Chilean state had not complied with 
its commitment made in Article 2 of the Convention, which required 
it to adopt internal regulations that protected the rights recognized 
by the Convention.80 The report recognized the efforts of the 
Chilean democratic government to effectuate the right to freedom of 
expression, but recommended that the Chilean government suspend 
the censorship of the film The Last Temptation of Christ and also 
recommended that the Chilean government adopt internal 
legislation to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
protected by the Convention.81 These recommendations were not 
accepted by the Chilean government and, consequently, the 
Commission directed the case to the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights.82 The Commission requested the Court to order 
Chile: 
1. To authorize the normal cinematographic exhibition and 
publicity of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ.” 
2. To adapt its constitutional and legal norms to the standards of 
freedom of expression embodied in the American Convention, [in 
order] to eliminate prior censorship of cinematographic 
productions and their publicity. 
 
 78. See id. ¶ 45(c) (summarizing the expert report of José Zalaquett Daher, lawyer, 
specializing in human rights, who had argued before the Commission that the Supreme 
Court’s decision to “suppress declarations made in the film as blasphemous or at least heretical 
because, in that Court’s opinion, they were shocking” constituted a confusion of the issues). 
 79. Id. ¶ 10. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
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3. To ensure that, in the exercise of their different powers, public 
bodies[,] their authorities and officials [effectively] exercise the 
rights and freedoms of expression, conscience and religion 
recognized in the American Convention and . . . abstain from 
imposing prior censorship on cinematographic productions. 
4. To make reparations to the victims in this case for the damage 
suffered. 
5. To pay the costs and reimburse the expenses incurred by the 
victims when litigating this case in both [the] domestic sphere and 
before the Commission and the Court, as well as reasonable fees for 
their representatives.83 
The case was resolved with a unanimous decision of merit and 
reparations by the Court on February 5, 2001. The Court affirmed 
the existence of a violation by Chile of the right to freedom of 
expression and thought protected by Article 13 of the Convention.84 
However, the Court determined that Chile had not violated the 
right to freedom of religion protected under Article 12.85 The Court 
explained its rejection of the Article 12 claim in paragraph seventy-
nine.86 The Court declared that the right to freedom of conscience 
and religion “is one of the foundations of democratic society. In its 
religious dimension, it constitutes a far-reaching element in the 
protection of the convictions of those who profess a religion and in 
their way of life.”87 With this understanding, after analyzing the 
probable violation of the right to religious freedom, the Court 
decided that Chile had not violated the religious freedom in 
accordance with the norms of Article 12 of the Convention since the 
prohibition “did not impair or deprive anyone of their right to 
maintain, change, profess or disseminate their religion or beliefs with 
total freedom.”88 
In his separate opinion, Judge Roux-Rengifo further interpreted 
the protection of religious freedom. He interpreted Article 12 to 
prohibit coercion in religious matters, including coercion to retain 
 
 83. Id. ¶ 3. 
 84. Id. ¶ 103. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. ¶ 79. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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religious beliefs.89 According to Judge Roux-Rengifo, in order for 
the censorship to have violated Article 12, the petitioners would have 
had to prove by specific evidence that the prohibition impaired their 
personal rights to change their religious beliefs.90 The judge agreed 
that a state has the duty to guarantee the freedom of every individual 
to change religion or beliefs, which is “usually the result of a long, 
complex process that includes hesitation, reflection and research.”91 
He emphasized that the state should guarantee that: 
[A] person may undergo this process in an environment of 
complete freedom and, in particular, that no one should be 
prevented from gathering information and experience and all 
the elements of an emotional, conceptual or any other 
nature, without violating the rights of others, that he 
considers necessary in order to make a fully-informed 
decision to change or maintain his faith.92 
Judge Roux-Rengifo concluded by declaring that “if the State, by act 
or omission, fails to ensure those rights, it violates the right to 
freedom of conscience and religion.”93 The prohibition of the film, 
however, simply did not rise to the level of preventing anyone from 
realizing these rights. 
For Chile, the consequences of this ruling included a 
requirement to modify its domestic law in order to eliminate the 
censorship of the film, and also an order to reimburse the victims 
and their representatives for expenses arising from the proceedings.94 
In its November 28, 2003, order, the Court declared that Chile had 
fully complied with its declaration.95 
The Court’s decision in this case, finding that censorship violated 
freedom of expression but not religious freedom, as Conforti 
agrees,96 was most likely influenced by the posture adopted with 
 
 89. Id. (Roux-Rengifo, J., separate opinion). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 103(4)–(5) (full court opinion). 
 95. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case (Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile), Compliance 
with Judgment at 6, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/supervisiones/tentacion_28_11_03_ing.pdf. 
 96. Conforti, supra note 71, at 283 (“La Corte interamericana ha adottato l’approccio 
della Commissione europea, ritenendo che proprio l’interdizione totale, e non limitata ai soli 
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respect to religious freedom in the European System. In fact, in its 
judgment, the Court cited the European Court of Human Rights in 
finding that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to 
convey information that may “shock, concern or offend the State or 
any sector of the population.”97 
On one hand, this decision recognized that a state can limit the 
exercise of free religious expression when there is a conflict with 
other rights or when such expression constitutes a threat to society 
or political stability.98 On the other hand, however, the Court 
concluded that, in the terms of the Convention, the state cannot 
prohibit the exercise of religious expression by prior censorship when 
it does not incite violence.99 Thus, it can be seen that the Inter-
American Court interprets the freedom of expression as one of the 
foundational principles of democratic society, considering it an abuse 
to censor ideas and opinions, even if they are unpopular.100 
Moreover, according to the understanding of the Inter-American 
Court, the right to freedom of expression in a religious sense is valid 
not only for those ideas that are favorably received, but also for those 
that shock, unsettle, or offend a state or a fraction of its 
population.101 
 
adulti, della proiezione della pellicola, abbia violato la libertà di espressione.”). 
 97. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 69 
(quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
handyside&sessionid=21918775&skin=hudoc-en). 
 98. See id. ¶¶ 76–80 (finding that the state did not violate Article 12 because the 
censorship “did not impair or deprive anyone of their right to maintain, change, profess or 
disseminate their religion or beliefs with total freedom” and recognizing that freedom of 
religious expression “may be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary 
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others”). 
 99. See id. ¶ 63 (citing Article 13, which prohibits prior censorship of expression except 
when necessary “for the sole purpose of regulating access to [public entertainments] for the 
moral protection of childhood and adolescence” and criminalizes “[a]ny propaganda for war 
and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless 
violence”). 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 64–69 (identifying both an individual dimension (right to express one’s 
thoughts) and a social dimension (right to receive information and thoughts expressed by 
others) in the right to freedom of thought and expression and concluding that “both 
dimensions are of equal importance and should be guaranteed simultaneously in order to give 
total effect to the right of freedom of thought and expression in the terms of Article 13 of the 
Convention”). 
 101. Id. ¶ 69 (quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49, 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html 
&highlight=handyside&sessionid=21918775&skin=hudoc-en). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The American Convention on Human Rights has changed the 
way the OAS encourages member states to adopt human rights 
norms in their internal legal structures. With the reorganization of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the creation 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Convention 
established legal organs to more effectively effectuate human rights. 
As states ratified the Convention, they agreed to implement the 
rights outlined therein and to subject themselves to the reports and 
recommendations of the Commission and the contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
While these measures have made the advancement of human 
rights protection in the Inter-American System possible, the 
effectiveness and relevancy of the Commission and the Court still 
face significant challenges. Foremost among these challenges is the 
lack of power to enforce the recommendations and decisions made 
against specific states. As mentioned above, states frequently ignore 
orders from the Court to investigate and punish those responsible 
for human rights violations.102 Going further, another weakness of 
the Inter-American System is the distinct grade of participation of 
the member of OAS in their human rights protection’s organs. Two 
of the most important nations of the hemisphere in territory and 
economic influence are not part of the Inter-American 
Convention,103 and in consequence refuse to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. In this sense, it is 
important to consider the limited adhesion of English speaking 
countries and the contrary massive adhesion of Latin American 
countries to the system’s organs and legal instruments. 
This result stands in stark contrast to the circumstances observed 
in the European human rights system. While the European Court of 
Human Rights does not see full compliance with every decision 
handed down, the rate of compliance in that system far exceeds the 
 
 102. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in 
the Hemisphere: Casting Down Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 243, 272 (2008). 
 103.  Canada has not signed the Convention and, while the U.S. signed the Convention 
in 1977, it has never ratified it. See Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights Signatories and Ratifications, http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-
32.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009). 
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rate observed thus far by the Inter-American Court.104 Why should 
this be? Both systems have in place methods for monitoring 
compliance and these methods appear to be substantially similar. In 
Europe, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, with the 
assistance of the Department for the Execution of Judgments, 
supervises compliance with decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights by requiring state reporting of steps taken in 
compliance with judgments.105 Similarly, the Inter-American Court 
monitors compliance by receiving reports from the states along with 
observations from complainants and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights.106 Why then should the European system enjoy a 
high rate of compliance while the Inter-American System fails to 
achieve complete remediation of human rights violations? 
The answer to this question is now and probably will remain 
elusive. Posner and Yoo argue that the success of independent 
adjudicative bodies in the European system is best explained by the 
unique political arrangement of the European states.107 While many 
member states of the OAS do share certain political attributes and 
colonial origins, their political and economic ties are far less 
substantial than those found in the European system. Perhaps it is 
this political difference that explains the Inter-American System’s 
 
 104. Posner and Yoo complain that good data to corroborate compliance estimates for 
the European Court of Human Rights is not available. Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 65. 
However, based on their count, states subject to an ECHR judgment alter their domestic law 
in compliance with the judgment about sixty-four percent of the time. Id.; see also Laurence R. 
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 
YALE L.J. 273, 296 (1997) (“The rate of compliance by states with the ECHR’s rulings is 
extremely high. Indeed, its judgments have been described as being ‘as effective as those of any 
domestic court.’” (citing BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
309 (2d ed. 1995))). 
 105. After the judgment is handed down, the Committee of Ministers invites the state 
subject to the judgment to report on the measures it has taken to comply. The Committee 
does not strike the judgment off its list of cases until the state has fully complied. In the event a 
state resists compliance, the Committee may apply political or diplomatic pressure. Council of 
Europe, Monitoring arrangements and means used by the Committee of Ministers, 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/01_introduction/01_introduction.asp#P
88_12564. 
 106. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 
63 (2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/motivos_ing.pdf. 
 107. Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 66 (“We believe that the relationship between 
states within the European Union is closer to the relationship between, say, Illinois and 
Indiana, than the relationship between Indonesia and Peru. European states share a legislative 
body, a bureaucracy, and a decades-long commitment to political unity. Other states do 
not.”). 
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comparatively low rate of compliance. Or, conversely, perhaps low 
compliance should be expected and the European System’s success is 
abnormal.108 
Perhaps another factor that could contribute to this difference in 
compliance is the type of cases heard in each system. Since its 
foundation, the Inter-American Court has frequently had to respond 
to the violent violations of human rights perpetrated by many Latin-
American dictatorial governments, including disappearances, 
arbitrary and summary executions, and the like.109 The European 
Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, hears comparatively few 
cases regarding such atrocities and, instead, often hears cases 
regarding “ordinary” violations of human rights, such as the right to 
a fair trial or free speech.110 With violent violations of human rights, 
full remedy of the violation requires investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of those responsible. Conversely, with “ordinary” 
violations of human rights, mere payment of damages and revision of 
violating domestic laws will often suffice. Yet, as discussed above, 
compliance with orders to pay damages is high, even in the Inter-
American System.111 American states, however, often ignore orders 
to punish those responsible for violating human rights or, when they 
do respond, they often inflict only light sentences.112 Thus, while full 
compliance in general among the American states appears low, these 
numbers might be deceptive when it comes to the Court’s and the 
Commission’s protection of religious rights because compliance with 
those judgments may not inflict the same costs upon states as orders 
to criminally punish wrongdoers. 
 
 108. It has been said that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international 
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” David H. Moore, Essay, A 
Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 879 (2003) (quoting 
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)). However, noncompliance with 
international law is prevalent and has been observed to be, perhaps, most prevalent in the 
context of international human rights law. Id. 
 109. See David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American 
Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1–2 (David J. Harris & 
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Tan, supra note 102, at 271–72 (hypothesizing that states may be unwilling to 
prosecute human rights violations either because they lack the resources to bring perpetrators 
to justice or because investigation might reveal that the government itself was responsible and 
accepting responsibility would be politically untenable). 
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While only a small number of the Commission’s 
recommendations and the Court’s decisions have dealt directly with 
the issue of religious freedom, they have had a profound effect in 
applying the Inter-American Human Right’s instruments and norms 
to the laws of the states that have complied with the 
recommendations and decisions. Furthermore, decisions not dealing 
directly with religious freedom have nevertheless had an impact on 
the religious freedom for citizens of the member states. Applying 
laws respecting the rights of conscientious objectors to all individuals 
no matter what their creed has been a change that recognizes an 
individual’s right to practice a religion that may not be shared by the 
majority of citizens in a particular state. Encouraging states to repeal 
amnesty laws will help to bring to justice those who have violated 
basic human rights, including religious freedom.  
While the Court’s decision in the “Last Temptation of Christ” 
case stated that Chile had not violated the religious freedom 
provision of the Convention (Article 12) when it refused to allow the 
showing of the film, The Last Temptation of Christ, the decision did 
focus on freedom of expression, which has a profound effect upon 
the enablement of religious freedom. Just as the Court allowed 
expression that was contrary to certain religious beliefs, some may 
see the decision as promoting the freedom to express religious beliefs 
and to practice religion without the fear of censure by the state. 
The legal instruments and the action of the Court and of the 
Commission mediating and adjudicating human rights violations has 
created a stronger voice for the effectuation of human rights norms 
through national laws and constitutions. While full compliance with 
recommendations and decisions is not high, both organs have had a 
relevant impact in changing the laws of member states. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, the recommendations and decisions have 
brought more attention to human rights violations and have put a 
spotlight on the norms of the American Convention of Human 
Rights as a model for the proper treatment of individuals. Religious 
freedom plays an important part in these norms, and the efforts of 
the Commission and the Court have and will continue to stand as a 
symbol of the Inter-American System’s dedication to improving this 
right for all peoples. 
